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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Climate change is generating new 
pressures for transition in coal intensive 
regions. The 2016 Paris Climate Agreement 
has led to new strategies and targets for 
reducing climate emissions at EU and 
national levels. Decarbonisation of the 
energy sector is a vital component of these 
strategies. The EU aims to reduce climate 
emissions from the energy sector by at least 
54 percent by 2030 (compared to 1990) 
and at least 93 percent by 2050. These 
targets imply a shift out of coal-mining and 
coal-fired power in coming decades. 
Coal transition requires regional policy 
intervention. Coal production and power 
stations are inevitably concentrated in 
particular places, and also typically 
become linked into other regional sectors 
and supply chains, as well as political, 
social and cultural networks, which support 
economic development but can also 
inhibit economic transition. 
Coal production in the Europe-30 is 
concentrated in specific regions in Poland, 
Germany, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria 
and Romania. Germany and Poland 
together account for 54 percent of the EU’s 
coal-related climate emissions. 
EU Cohesion policy 2021-27 is expected to 
include a focus on the carbon-free 
economy, including energy transition. This 
could include support for coal transition 
regions e.g. through an Energy Transition 
Fund. Wider EU support is seen in the Coal 
Regions in Transition Platform, as well as in 
INTERREG and HORIZON projects. 
National regional policies are also targeting 
coal regions. Poland’s coal sector has seen 
major restructuring since 1990 but it remains 
an important regional employer. Poland is 
committed to meeting international targets 
on climate emissions and energy transition 
but also faces the need to ensure energy 
supply and regional employment. The 
Programme for Silesia supports a shift from 
traditional sectors such as coal towards 
future-oriented sectors.  
Germany is committed to the phasing-out 
of coal-fired power in order to meet 
climate targets. In 2019, the federal 
government agreed an ambitious 
programme of support for the transition of 
the remaining brown coal regions, with €40 
billion of federal funding to 2038.  
Historic experiences of coal transition 
suggest the need for future policies to 
prioritise a long-term, well-funded and 
multi-faceted strategic approach, drawing 
on the participation of a wide range of 
stakeholders at multiple levels, and 
including efforts to generate new ideas, 
mobilise regional capacities and 
reconfigure social capital, as well as to 
involve local communities in transition. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Structural change in coal regions has risen up the policy agenda in the context of intensified 
concerns with climate change. The 2016 Paris Agreement, setting long-term goals to limit 
increases in global temperatures, has led to new climate strategies at EU level and within 
individual European countries. Decarbonisation of the energy sector is an important element 
of these strategies, as it is the leading contributor to CO2 emissions. The EU aims to reduce total 
climate emissions by at least 40 percent by 2030 (at least 80 percent by 2050), compared to 
1990 levels, and to reduce emissions from the energy sector by at least 54 percent by 2030 (at 
least 93 percent by 2050).1 
Energy production from fossil fuels such as coal is a major contributor to climate emissions. Coal 
is currently mined in 41 regions across 12 EU countries, making it the most abundant fossil fuel 
in the EU and a significant source of economic activity, both directly and through linkages into 
wider supply chains.2 Policy-makers in coal-intensive countries and regions are faced with a 
dilemma: Should they continue with coal3-mining and coal-fired energy production, despite 
high climate emissions, or should they transition out of coal, and face regional structural 
change and, potentially, challenges with energy supply? 
Regional policies in countries such as the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and the United 
Kingdom, as well as at EU level, have long included a focus on coal regions because: 
 Coal production and power generation are by definition located in specific regions, 
so that the economic and social impacts of restructuring or closure are concentrated 
in these locations. 
 These impacts are often exacerbated by the key role that coal-mining and power 
generation play in wide-ranging regional supply chains, leading to knock-on effects on 
other sectors, e.g. iron/steel, plant/mechanical engineering, and chemicals. 
 The economic and employment impacts of restructuring are heightened because coal 
sector jobs (and jobs in related sectors) are typically well-paid and highly skilled from a 
regional perspective. 
 The geographical concentration of economic activities, plus the hardships associated 
with coal mining, often lead to a strong sense of community in these regions, so that 
restructuring may lead to wider social dislocation. 
 This sense of community may also feed into strong trade unionism and political activism, 
potentially leading to influence on political decision-making. 
This paper begins by examining coal production and emissions in European countries and 
regions, as well as the implications of climate change targets for coal and wider energy 
transition (Section 2). It then provides an overview of EU support for coal transition regions 
(Section 3), as well as national regional policies for coal regions in Germany and Poland 
(Section 4). Section 5 provides an assessment, draws conclusions and sets out questions for 
discussion.  
 2 
 
2 COAL POWER AND TRANSITION IN EUROPE TODAY 
Coal was one of the main fuels of European societies in the 19th and 20th centuries, and coal-
mining and coal-fired power plants continue to be an important source of energy and 
economic activities today in some countries and regions. Coal-based energy use, climate 
targets, and regional structural change are inextricably linked. Coal is an important contributor 
to climate emissions, while coal production and coal-fired energy are strongly concentrated 
in specific regions. 
2.1 Coal production and emissions across Europe 
The coal market has been charaterised by major fluctuations over time, but coal use has 
decreased steadily since the 1990s due to mine exhaustion, market changes, and climate 
change policies. In 1990, coal provided c. 40 percent of energy consumption and power 
generation in the EU-28 but by 2015 accounted for 16 percent of EU-28 energy consumption 
and 24 percent of power generation.4 
Figure 1: Gross inland production and consumption of hard coal and brown coal in the EU-28 
(1990-2017), in million tonnes per annum (Source: Eurostat). 
 
Hard coal production in the EU-28 has declined relatively steadily from 368 million tonnes in 
1990 to 79 million tonnes in 2017 (Figure 1), while brown coal (including lignite) production 
declined rapidly in the 1990s but has remained at c. 400 million tonnes since 1999. Consumption 
of hard coal in the EU-28 has halved since the 1990s, while brown coal consumption mirrors 
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year, with production levels decreasing from 0.30 to 0.13 million tonnes per year. Overall, most 
coal is used for the production of electricity and heat. 
The difference between hard coal production and consumption in Figure 1 is due to coal 
imports e.g. from the USA, Colombia, South Africa, Australia and Russia. European countries’ 
subsidies for domestic coal production at sometimes aimed at ensuring energy security and 
limiting dependency on foreign energy sources.5 
From a geographical perspective, the number of EU Member States producing hard coal has 
decreased from 14 to five: Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, United Kingdom and Spain. In 
2018, Poland was the largest producer of hard coal (63.4 million tonnes), with 86 percent of 
the EU total.6 For brown coal, Germany accounted for 45 percent of EU production in 2017, 
followed by Poland (16 percent), the Czech Republic and Greece (both 10 percent), Bulgaria 
(9 percent) and Romania (7 percent). Coal production is declining steadily in most coal 
producing countries. Coal production has fallen most rapidly in the United Kingdom (1991-95), 
France (1990-2000), Norway (2007-2012), Romania (1992-1995) and Belgium (1990-1992). 
Figure 2 shows the changes in consumption levels between 1990 and 2017 (in percentages). 
In comparison to the 47 percent decline in total coal consumption in the EU-28, as displayed 
by the yellow line, it is clear that most smaller countries and the United Kingdom show the 
strongest reduction and almost entirely phased out coal use. The reduction levels in Bulgaria, 
Finland, Greece, Italy, Poland and Sweden are relatively low, whereas the Netherlands, 
Norway and Portugal have increased their coal consumption since 1990. 
Figure 2: Percentage change in gross consumption of hard coal and brown coal between 1990 
and 2017 in the EU-28 and Norway (Source: Eurostat). 
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2.2 Socio-economic changes and the energy transition 
Due to the ongoing phasing out of hard coal and lignite mining, the European Commission 
estimates that around two-thirds (67.5 percent) of the current 237,000 direct jobs may be lost 
by 2030.7 Besides direct job losses, firms in coal-related supply chains (e.g. steel and automotive 
engineering, chemical industries) and local service providers may also feel the effects of the 
changing intensities and geographies of energy production. The EU Member States with the 
highest production and consumption of coal are Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria and Romania. Germany and Poland account for 51 percent of the EU’s coal-fired 
power and also for 54 percent of coal-related emissions.8  
Figure 3 shows the regional dimension of the direct job losses, as well as the share of 
employment in carbon energy intensive industries and the automotive sector. Regional 
variations are high, both within and between countries. In addition to complex economic and 
employment transition challenges in coal producing regions, historic dependence on coal 
production has also shaped residential, demographic, landscape, political, cultural and social 
class-related patterns of particular regions.  
Figure 3: Coal and carbon-intensive regions 
Source: EPSC (2019) Delivering on European Common Goods: Strengthening Member States’ Capacity 
to Act in the 21st Century. Brussels: European Political Strategy Centre, May 2019, p.19. 
Regions in the EU28, which are likely to be particularly strongly affected by transition out of 
coal, in terms of potential for direct job losses, include: 9 
 Poland: Coal production is concentrated in the south-western region of Upper Silesia, 
which also accounts for a high share of coal-fired power generation. Transition out of 
coal would also be likely to cause systemic regional economic effects, as other 
important industries, notably automotive engineering, are interconnected with the 
local coal sector. The Polish situation is examined further in Section 4.2. 
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 Germany: Brown coal production and coal-fired power stations are concentrated in 
the regions of Lusatia (Länder of Brandenburg and Saxony), the Rhineland (Land North-
Rhine Westfalia), and the Central coal region (Länder of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt). 
The Helmstedt area (Land Lower Saxony) also experiences challenges due to the 
legacy of brown coal mining. In addition, hard coal is produced in areas of the Länder 
of North-Rhine Westfalia, the Saarland, Lower Saxony, and Mecklenburg West 
Pomerania. The German situation is explored in more detail in Section 4.1. 
 Central Europe: Coal production and power continues to be important in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, often with regional systemic linkages 
between coal and wider engineering and other supply chains. Transition out of coal 
would imply the loss of thousands of directly related jobs in these countries. 
 Romania, Bulgaria and Greece: Coal-mining is also a significant issue in regions such as 
Southwest Romania, East Bulgaria and West Macedonia in Greece. The efficiency of 
coal-fired power plants is particularly low in these regions. Structural change would 
cause particular difficulties in these regions, due to low national GDP per capita and 
(particularly in the case of Greece) high nationwide unemployment rates. 
 Spain: While only producing 3 percent of EU hard coal, transition is complicated by low 
national economic growth and low population density in coal-producing regions (e.g. 
Aragón, Asturias and Castilla-y-León). Other regions, such as the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, are also affected through their dependence on carbon-intensive industries 
(e.g. petrochemicals, automotive engineering). The use of coal in power generation 
has risen from low levels in recent years, partly fuelled by imported hard coal. 
2.3 Energy transition and climate targets 
Most national strategies to phase out coal are based on the 2016 Paris Agreement’s long-term 
goal of containing the global temperature increase “well below” 2°C and ideally limited to 
1.5°C.10 Decarbonisation of the power sector, the largest contributing sector to CO2 emissions, 
is crucial for meeting this goal.11 For the EU, this means that climate targets directly involve a 
reduction in the number of coal-fired power plants. Figure 4 illustrates EU climate targets set 
out within the 2050 low-carbon strategy (percentages are compared to the 1990 level). 
Intermediate targets for 2030 include a 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and 
a 32 percent share of renewable energy sources in energy production. 
 6 
 
Figure 4: EU climate strategy for 205012 
 
Coal producing countries (such as Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania) 
are among the major generators of overall carbon and other emissions, but other countries 
with particularly high coal-fired energy consumption (e.g. power plants, technology sectors) 
can also be carbon-intensive - and are significantly affected by a shift in energy source.13 Thus 
countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia and Greece have 
high CO2-emission levels in tonnes per capita in (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: EU coal power plants and CO2 consumption per capita 
Source: EPRC based on https://climateanalytics.carto.com/me (accessed 18.6.2019). 
While coal phase-out strategies partly involve the closure of coal-fired power plants and coal 
mines, they also include measures aimed at increasing the predictability of energy supply, and 
at reducing the economic, social and environmental costs of transition in coal-intensive 
regions. There is often particular interest in renewable energies, which have the benefit of 
being inexhaustible, and can stimulate the emergence of new business models in the energy 
industry and potentially create new employment in the affected regions.14 
3 EU SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL COAL TRANSITION 
EU policies have long supported restructuring in coal regions and energy-related training, R&I 
and (in Cohesion countries) infrastructure. Historically, support from the European Coal and 
Steel Community was also available to support restructuring in coal areas. More recently, the 
themes of energy transition and decarbonisation have become prominent in Cohesion policy 
and RD&I policy, through the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme. 
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3.1 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
The ECSC was set up in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris, which was signed by Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The ECSC aimed to 
contribute to economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement 
of the standard of living in the participating countries through the institution of a common 
market for coal and steel.15 The ECSC budget allocated funding to support restructuring, via 
loans at favourable market rates for investment projects associated with the creation of jobs 
in areas affected by restructuring of coal and steel. Jobs arising had to be suitable for former 
coal and steel workers. Loans were implemented directly and through financial intermediaries. 
At the same time, ECSC loans were available for investment projects that promoted the 
consumption of European Community coal, and for converting gas or oil fired boiler systems 
to coal. The ECSC institutions were absorbed into the EU institutions after 2002. 
3.2 Cohesion policy 
Since the 1990s, Cohesion policy funding for coal restructuring has been available from 
specific initiatives such as RECHAR and, in recent years, through mainstream programmes 
which are supporting the transition to low and zero carbon. 
3.2.1 RECHAR Community Initiative for coal-mining areas (1990-99) 
During the 1990s, coal regions were the specific target of the RECHAR Community Initiative. 
RECHAR allocated a total of €1.1 billion in 1990-99 period from the ERDF and ESF, with additional 
resources from the ECSC, and from EIB loans. Eligible areas were sub-NUTS III spatial units which 
were losing at least 1,000 jobs in coal-mining - in total, 26 areas (population of c. 14 million), 
mainly in Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
RECHAR supported the economic conversion of coal-mining areas through: the promotion of 
new activities (27 percent); vocational training for miners losing their jobs (17 percent); and 
infrastructure, notably environmental regeneration (56 percent).16 An evaluation found that 
RECHAR leveraged public/private sector funding, and catalysed regeneration, but also that: 
 Programmes and projects lacked critical mass, particularly in the UK, where project 
calls were published after mainstream Structural Fund programmes were approved. In 
France, in contrast, RECHAR projects were developed in the context of wider regional 
or national development plans, and tended to be larger. Programmes in Belgium, 
France and the UK mainly funded infrastructure, while Germany and Spain had a 
stronger focus on promoting new activities and training; 
 Target-setting was limited, leading to a lack of data and limits on scope for evaluation; 
 Programmes and projects were at times not clearly distinctive, compared to 
mainstream Structural Funds programmes.17 
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After 2000, most Community Initiatives were discontinued, with the intention that eligible 
measures under RECHAR (and other initiatives such as RESIDER, RETEX and KONVER) would be 
mainstreamed within the Cohesion policy programmes for Objective 1 and 2 areas.  
3.2.2 Supporting the transition to low carbon (2007-13 and 2014-20) 
In 2007-13, the focus of Cohesion policy moved further towards supporting the transition to a 
low-carbon economy. The ERDF and Cohesion Fund provided increased funding (€18.5 billion) 
for renewable energy, energy efficiency, clean urban transport and cycling infrastructure. 
However, climate change mitigation was not an explicit priority, and there was no obligation 
to earmark funding for these interventions. 
The commitment to climate change mitigation increased significantly in 2014-20, with the 
earmarking of funding for low carbon (20 percent in more developed regions, 15 percent in 
transition regions, and 12 percent in less-developed regions). In addition, the thematic 
objective ‘Supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors’ was introduced, 
as well as a tracking methodology of assigning climate coefficients (100 percent, 40 percent 
or 0 percent) to the different intervention fields of Cohesion policy. 
In 2014-20, the European Commission set out its longer-term visions in the form of the 2030 
Climate & Energy framework and the 2050 Long-term Strategy, leading to a shift from ‘low 
carbon’ to ‘climate neutral’ (i.e. reducing carbon emissions by 85-90 percent). These strategies 
are expected to inform climate-related funding post-2020, with stricter targets and a clearer 
transformation focus. The funds spent on the specific low-carbon objective and on wider 
climate action (including in the energy sector, industry, transport and agriculture) are forecast 
to amount to €200 billion in 2014-20.18 
Cohesion policy programmes in 2014-20 have tended not to be used for activities directly 
related to coal mining, or to prepare regions for the future beyond coal, due to a focus on 
wider regional priorities.19 Related, Cohesion policy support for low-carbon projects has mainly 
targeted renewables and energy efficiency, rather than being “mainstreamed in the sense of 
supporting the transition towards a carbon neutral economy, which would include support to 
phase-out high carbon technologies”.20 However, Cohesion policy has funded interventions 
such as re-training, labour mobility and ICT which are particularly relevant for the structural 
transition out of coal mining and use. 
3.2.3 Future Cohesion policy support for coal and energy transition 
Although negotiations are still ongoing on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-
2027 (including the Cohesion policy budget), it is likely that significant funding will be allocated 
to carbon-free economy objectives, including sustainable energy transition. The European 
Commission has proposed earmarking a minimum of 25 percent of the EU’s MFF 2021-2027 for 
climate-related funding, up from 20 percent in 2014-20.  
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Cohesion policy funding is likely to be subject to requirements to concentrate funds on themes 
considered to have high added value. The Commission is proposing that the majority of ERDF 
funding would be concentrated on the innovation and carbon-free economy objectives, with 
more flexibility for less developed countries. In addition, climate tracking methodologies will be 
applied more strictly and climate mainstreaming requirements are expected to be extended 
to all investment areas.21 
In addition, the European Parliament has proposed that €4.8 billion be allocated to an Energy 
Transition Fund (ETF) to support EU coal-dependent regions. This will potentially be a mix 
between dedicated funds and existing Structural Funds resources, aimed at supporting poorer 
EU regions. Linking with the themes of the Coal Regions in Transition Platform (see Section 3.3.1), 
ETF funding could potentially be earmarked for retraining workers, unemployment schemes, 
helping local businesses and other measures.  
3.3 The wider EU agenda for coal-intensive regions  
Several recent initiatives have seen support for coal regions rise up the EU agenda. These new 
initiatives have already had an impact on the 2014-20 Cohesion policy programmes, driving 
an increased focus on coal and carbon-intensive regions.  
3.3.1 Coal Regions in Transition Platform 
In 2017, the European Commission launched a series of country teams to support pilot coal 
regions in their transition efforts. A dedicated Platform for Coal Regions in Transition was 
established to facilitate the exchange of best practices and to discuss strategies and projects 
with a potential to kick-start the transition process.22 The Platform aims to: 
 build capacity, providing technical assistance and advice to coal regions in transition, 
focusing on three key areas of the transition process (strategies and governance; 
project identification; and project design and development); 
 develop support materials, through toolkits, guidelines and reports, covering transition-
related issues such as governance, environmental rehabilitation, employment, 
financing and clean air and technologies; and 
 connect stakeholders, facilitating collective dialogue among regions and the wider 
stakeholder community. 
Pilot projects are underway in 14 regions: Silesia (Poland), Western Macedonia (Greece), 
Trencin (Slovakia), Moravia-Silesia, Usti and Karlovy Vary (Czech Republic), Jiu Valley 
(Romania), Asturias, Aragón, Castilla-y-León and Castilla-La Mancha (Spain), and in 
Brandenburg, Saxony and Saxony Anhalt (Germany). 
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3.3.2 INTERREG DeCarb Project (2018-2023) 
The INTERREG-funded DeCarb project supports stakeholder engagement and exchange of 
experience on clean energy transition in coal-intensive regions. 23 With nine partners in nine EU 
countries, it runs from June 2018 to May 2023. Activities include: 
 Designing methods for assessing the socio-economic impact of decoupling energy 
and coal mining in target regions; 
 Identifying good practices on decarbonisation and clean energy transition, including 
the mapping of funding instruments; 
 SWOT analyses to determine decarbonisation growth pathways; and  
 Analyses of needs relating to environmental restitution and land restoration, focusing 
on ecosystem services and building site development. 
3.3.3 TRACER (2019-2022) 
EPRC is cooperating with 14 partners in the 
Horizon 2020-funded TRACER project, which 
aims to support nine coal-intensive regions 
to agree Smart Specialisation Strategies 
and to facilitate transition towards 
sustainable energy systems.24  
The nine (EU-28 and non-EU) regions are: 
Southeast Region (Bulgaria), North West 
Bohemia (Czech Republic), Lusatia 
(Germany), West Macedonia (Greece), 
Upper Silesia (Poland), Jiu Valley 
(Romania), Kolubara (Serbia), Wales 
(United Kingdom), and Donetsk (Ukraine).  
 
TRACER aims to: 
 Mobilise a wide range of stakeholders (from business, research/education, 
government/policy, and civil society) to come together in order to discuss and agree 
on a shared strategic vision and priorities for energy R&D&I in coal transition regions, 
and to move forwards with accessing investment and implementing these strategies 
and priorities; 
 Analyse best practice examples of transition processes in coal intensive regions, 
including: social, environmental and ecological issues; labour markets and tourism; 
financial instruments and funding programmes at regional, national and EU levels; 
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stakeholder engagement; and transition of regional energy production towards 
renewables. 
4 NATIONAL REGIONAL POLICIES FOR COAL TRANSITION 
Regional policies have often emerged in response to the structural economic difficulties of 
coal producing regions. For example: 
 In the UK, regional policy began in the 1930s, with central government investment in 
industrial estates, and the provision of loans to firms establishing plants in four Special 
Areas with high unemployment rates due to structural change in the coal industry and 
other heavy industry sectors (South Wales, Clydeside, Durham and Tyneside, and West 
Cumberland).25 
 In the Federal Republic of Germany, regional policy focused on areas of economic 
weakness following World War II, as well as eastern border areas. However, the creation 
of the Regional Joint Task in 1969 (still Germany’s main regional policy instrument) was 
shaped by the economic downturn of 1966-67 and its negative impact on coal 
producing areas, such as the Ruhr area.26 
 In the Czech Republic, the challenges faced by coal mining regions as a result of 
industrial restructuring and privatisation in the 1990s drove a number of initiatives and 
interventions that laid the foundations for contemporary regional policy.27 
 In Poland, regional policy in the 1990s took the form of ad hoc instruments targeting 
specific regions with particularly severe problems caused by economic transformation, 
such as the Contract for Katowice in Upper Silesia, which set out key actions for 
restructuring the region’s industrial economy, including coal.28 
This section focuses on two EU Member States – Poland and Germany – which are contrasting 
examples of countries at different stages of coal restructuring and transition, and 
representative of different groups of Member States. Both are strong producers and consumers 
of coal, and both have significant policy agendas for addressing the challenges facing coal 
producing regions.  
4.1 Poland 
Poland faces serious economic and political challenges in relation to coal, which are 
illustrative of the situation facing other major coal producing countries, such as the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. The coal sector in Poland has seen major restructuring since 1990 but it 
remains an important regional employer. Poland is committed to meeting international targets 
on climate emissions and energy transition but also faces the need to ensure energy supply 
and regional employment. The regional policy Programme for Silesia supports a shift from 
traditional sectors such as coal towards future-oriented sectors.  
 13 
4.1.1 Coal production in Poland 
Hard coal is the largest energy resource in Poland. Nearly half of Polish electricity production 
is generated in hard coal-fired power plants. National hard coal reserves have a realistic 
potential of c. 40-50 years (although hard coal deposits would, in principle, be sufficient for 
over 860 years of extraction if technical, economic and social constraints did not exist).29 
Much of Poland’s coal production is concentrated in Upper Silesia, a highly urbanised area in 
south-western Poland, with a population of 4.6 million (which has been steadily decreasing 
since 1989, due to negative natural population growth and strong net out-migration). Silesia is 
home to Poland’s three largest coal corporations (with 27 mines), and accounts for 82 percent 
of the coal extracted nationally in 2007-15. Coal production shapes the region’s economy, 
society and physical geography, accounting for seven percent of regional GDP (2016). The 
Upper Silesian Coal basin encompasses 45 percent of the region’s surface area, and over 50 
km2 of land is awaiting reclamation. 
Employment in coal-mining (including both hard coal and lignite) significant: 113,500 people 
in 2016, of which 23,500 in lignite mining and 90,000 in hard coal mining.30 There is further 
significant employment in coal-fired power generation. In addition, coal is an important input 
to other industries, such as automotive engineering, so that coal restructuring would have a 
wider impact on regional economic structures. Coal-mining and coal-fired energy production 
are also of considerable political, social and cultural importance, both nationally and 
especially for the region of Upper Silesia.  
4.1.2 National Energy and Climate Plan 2021-2030  
Poland’s coal sector has seen significant restructuring and job losses since the 1990s in the 
context of economic transition. Climate targets are expected to lead to a gradual shift from 
fossil fuels to renewable energy sources but coal currently remains important, both politically 
and in terms of energy supply. Poland’s National Energy and Climate Plan 2021-2030 (of 
January 2019) includes commitments to support significant growth in renewable energy 
capacity but also anticipates that coal will continue to account for 60 percent of electricity 
generation by 2030 (currently: 77 percent).31 
4.1.3 National Programme for the Coal Mining Sector 2016-2030 
In this context, the National Programme for the Coal Mining Sector 2016-2030 aims to create 
conditions to help build a profitable, efficiency and modern coal mining sector. Key 
programme goals include:  
 Ensuring that domestic coal supply is sufficient to meet domestic demand; 
 Improving working conditions for miners; and  
 Supporting transition to a low-carbon economy.  
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The Programme includes funding opportunities for mining companies (e.g. from the national 
promotional bank BGK) and PhD scholarships in the sector. There is also a national Programme 
for the Lignite Mining Sector, which oversees the exploitation of existing mines and supports 
the development of new technologies and innovation, contributing to the implementation of 
low-carbon technologies.  
Pressure is also increasing for measures to restore the environment and to transform former 
mining sites into potential areas for business development. These sites are often attractive to 
businesses due to their location, existing infrastructure, size and zoning in local plans.  
4.1.4 The Programme for Silesia: Goals 
The Programme for Silesia was adopted in 2017, as part of the Polish Strategy for Responsible 
Development. It aims to support the region’s transition from reliance on traditional sectors 
(including coal mining and metallurgy) towards more innovative and high-tech sectors, in 
order to “gently transform” the region’s economic profile. The programme aims to:  
 Increase industrial innovation and investment in technological development in the 
region; 
 Increase the professional profile and qualifications of the region's inhabitants; 
 Improve the quality of the natural environment; 
 Develop and modernise transport infrastructure; 
 Using the region's potential to ensure energy security and to improve conditions for 
development in Silesia’s cities. 
The programme is based on cooperation between the central State and the region, including 
social, economic, environmental and governance actions.  
4.1.5 The Programme for Silesia: Funding and projects 
The programme aims to fund 85 projects with a total value of over PLN 55 billion (c. €13 billion). 
By June 2019, c. PLN 42 billion (c. €10 billion) had been allocated to projects (c. 75 percent of 
the planned funding). Until 2020, the bulk of funding will come from Cohesion policy 
programmes (particularly the Silesian Regional OP and the National OP for Infrastructure and 
the Environment), with domestic public and private co-financing. After 2020, additional 
instruments will be introduced, combining national, regional and local resources, as well as EU 
funding outside Cohesion policy. Silesia is also part of the European Union’s Coal Regions in 
Transition Platform (see Section 3.3.1). 
Examples of projects funded under the Programme for Silesia include:32 
 Around PLN 1 billion (€233 million) from the Cohesion policy OP for Infrastructure and 
the Environment to improve air quality.33 
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 Funding of PLN 270 million (€63 million) for thermal modernisation of multi-family 
residential buildings, modernisation of heating networks and promotion of modern 
production of electricity and heat. 
 Funding of PLN 220 million (€51 million) from the National Centre for Research and 
Development for innovative investments in the steel, energy, automotive, medicine 
and pharmaceuticals sectors in the region. 
Funding of around PLN 40 million (€9.3 million) for seven Silesian universities, focused on the 
creation of new faculties in fields that are seen as crucial for the transition of the regional 
economy (IT, medical and energy sectors and cybersecurity). 
4.2 Germany 
Germany’s 2016 Federal Climate Protection Plan 2050 set out the commitment to phasing out 
of coal-fired power in order to meet international targets to reduce climate emissions. In 2019, 
the federal government agreed an ambitious programme of support for the transition of the 
remaining brown coal regions, with €40 billion of federal funding to 2038. 
4.2.1 Coal production in Germany 
Brown coal accounted for 23.1 percent of Germany’s gross electricity production in 2016 
(2000: 25.7 percent) and 11.4 percent of primary energy consumption (2000: 10.8 percent). 
Domestically produced brown coal is largely used domestically for electricity production and 
district heating (92 percent).34 
In 2016, c. 20,000 people were employed directly in Germany’s brown coal sector, including 
both mining and coal-fired power stations. The coal sector is also estimated to have significant 
positive indirect and induced employment effects via three channels, namely: (i) demand for 
intermediate goods; (ii) demand for consumer goods, due to the spending of wages/salaries 
in the coal sector; and (iii) demand for investment goods. Overall, it is estimated that one job 
in the coal sector leads to an additional 1.6 jobs in Germany’s main coal regions, and an 
additional 2.8 jobs nationwide.35 
Brown coal production and power in Germany is concentrated in the regions of Lusatia 
(Länder of Brandenburg and Saxony), the Rhineland (Land North-Rhine Westfalia), and the 
Central coal region (Länder of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt). In addition, the Helmstedt area 
(Land Lower Saxony) continues to experience challenges due to historic brown coal 
production. Further, hard coal continues to be produced in areas of the Länder of North-Rhine 
Westfalia, the Saarland, Lower Saxony, and Mecklenburg West Pomerania. 
4.2.2 Federal Climate Protection Plan 2050 
The challenges facing coal transition regions have become a major theme in German regional 
policy since late 2016, when a new federal Climate Protection Plan 2050 was agreed.36 This 
Plan committed the federal government to phasing out lignite (brown coal) fired power 
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stations and, in this context, to addressing the regional socio-economic impacts of the closure 
of coal mines and coal-fired power stations. 
4.2.3 Federal government decision to allocate €40 billion by 2038 
In June 2018, the federal government launched a Commission on Growth, Structural Change 
and Employment to assess the impact of the federal Climate Protection Plan on structural 
change in lignite regions, and to propose measures to support economic development in 
these regions.37 The Commission was made up of high-level experts from the fields of policy-
making, business, trade unions, environmental protection, and energy, and linked to a federal 
civil service committee and secretariat. Discussions were informed by a series of studies.38 
The Commission’s final report was published in January 2019. It analysed the situation facing 
Germany’s lignite regions from climate protection, energy policy and economic development 
perspectives, and proposed measures a) for the energy sector and b) to support structural 
change and employment in the coal regions.39 It recommended ending coal-fired power 
generation by 2038, and proposed federal funding of c. €40 billion for the lignite regions. 
In May 2019, the federal government published a paper,40 committing the federal government 
to allocating c. €40 billion of federal funding for investment in the lignite regions by 2038. This 
funding is divided into three blocks. 
4.2.4 Step 1: Funding for lignite regions in 2019-21 
The federal government and relevant Länder have agreed a programme for 2019-21 which 
draws on the €500 million annually that the federal government has already budgeted for 
‘regional structural policy / structural change in coal policy’.  
This includes up to €240 million per annum for existing federal programmes that support 
sustainable locational effects and new opportunities for value added creation and 
employment in the three largest lignite regions (i.e. the Lausitz, the Rhineland, and the central 
coal region). Around €90 million will be allocated to projects in the Helmstedt area of Lower 
Saxony. Further federal funding (c. €1 billion) will be allocated to structurally weak anthracite 
areas (e.g. in the Länder of North-Rhine Westfalia, the Saarland, Lower Saxony, and 
Mecklenburg West Pomerania). 
4.2.5 Step 2: Additional federal funding to affected Länder 
The federal government will provide an additional €14 billion by 2038 to the four Länder with 
ongoing lignite production. The overall division between Länder will be as follows: 
 Brandenburg: 25.8 percent; 
 North-Rhine Westfalia: 37.0 percent; 
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 Saxony: 25.2 percent; 
 Saxony-Anhalt: 12 percent. 
The Länder will be able to use the funding for significant investment projects which they or 
local authorities initiate and manage, and for types of interventions outlined in the Constitution 
(Articles 104b and 104c) e.g. business-oriented infrastructure, R&I, business investment, and 
training. The funding will be regulated by a new Investment Law for Coal Regions and by an 
agreement between the federal authorities and the four Länder.  
4.2.6 Step 3: Additional federal investment in the lignite regions 
The federal government will also allocate up to €26 billion by 2038 (i.e. up to €1.3 billion 
annually) for its own priority investment projects in the lignite regions. In the next five years, 
funding will include up to:  
 €2.6 billion for North-Rhine Westfalia; 
 €1.9 billion for Brandenburg;  
 €1.8 billion for Saxony;  
 €0.86 billion for Saxony-Anhalt.  
4.2.7 Enterprise Coal Area programme 2017 
The existing ‘Enterprise Coal Area’ programme (Unternehmen Revier) is one of the instruments 
through which these federal resources will be channelled.41 This programme was launched in 
November 2017, with €4 million annually over a ten year period from Germany’s Energy and 
Climate Fund (Energie- und Klimafonds, EKF), targeted on the lignite regions. 
4.2.8 New legal and coordination frameworks 
Federal funding will be regulated by a new law and supported by a coordination committee, 
chaired by a State Secretary from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, and 
made up of State Secretaries from other relevant federal ministries and representatives of four 
Länder (Brandenburg, North-Rhine Westfalia, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt).  
5 CONCLUSIONS  
5.1 New challenges and opportunities linked to climate 
transition 
The drivers of coal restructuring have shifted radically in the past decade. Transition is now 
mainly being fuelled by the urgency of global climate-related challenges and by 
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internationally agreed targets to reduce carbon emissions – rather than by concerns over the 
value-for-money and productivity of coal production and power in individual regions. 
Climate transition implies a more uncertain context for regional economic restructuring and 
employment creation, as other carbon-intensive industries (e.g. metals, automotive 
engineering…) also face pressure to reduce emissions. Nevertheless, climate change 
strategies are also generating new economic and employment opportunities, which coal 
restructuring regions may be able to exploit, such as renewable energy technologies, circular 
economy models and other more sustainable technologies and business activities. Much 
depends on wider regional advantages, notably regional location/accessibility, as well as their 
human, knowledge and physical capital, and the quality of institutions and governance.  
Further, the scope for coal-intensive regions to transition into new activities is likely to be shaped 
by stakeholders’ capacity to manage and transform the political, social and cultural 
challenges which are traditionally associated with coal restructuring. A particular difficulty is 
the planning and phasing of transition i.e. how can sufficient momentum be ensured to meet 
climate targets, while also allowing enough time for economic, employment and socio-
cultural change so that regional economic and social dislocation is limited? 
5.2 Lessons from historical regional policies for coal 
communities 
The impact of coal restructuring continues to be seen in former coal communities across 
Europe which continue to have poorer business, employment and life opportunities. 
Nevertheless, some former coal regions are thriving and have moved into new sectors, with 
future-oriented, skilled employment.42 
Historical case studies show that regional transition out of coal requires active policy support 
for restructuring and environmental mitigation, as well as significant investment to reorient 
physical infrastructure, facilitate the growth of new sectors, and enhance human resources 
and research/innovation. Effective transition strategies need to include a mix of 
complementary policy instruments, and to be based in a thorough assessment of the barriers 
and opportunities for innovation facing the transitioning region. Lessons drawn from an 
overview of historical cases of regional support for coal communities include:43 
 Economic transition out of coal usually takes decades, and the associated socio-
cultural and political changes can take even longer.  
 There is thus a need for a long-term strategic approach and significant funding, aimed 
at ‘managing a retreat’ out of coal-related activities. 
 Strategies need to be multi-faceted, including not only on physical regeneration and 
infrastructure, but also support for business creation and investment, for re-training 
workers and wider education/training, as well as for R&D&I, and for community 
development. 
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 Strategies should actively involve a wide range of stakeholders, including business, 
policy, research/education and civil society, and at multiple levels (local, regional, 
national, European), in order to mobilise a variety of capacities and resources. The 
participation of local/regional stakeholders and citizens in community development 
processes can help to facilitate the socio-cultural dimensions of transition. 
 Efforts to build new forms of cooperation across sectoral and organisational 
boundaries, and to involve new stakeholders, can help to generate new ideas, 
mobilise regional capacities and reconfigure social capital. This is particularly important 
where the dominance of coal and related sectors has led to functional, political and 
cognitive “lock in” to traditional ways of thinking and acting.44 
 Strategies should aim to build on regional strengths and to prioritise the diversification 
of local/regional economies and supply chains away from the coal sector, also 
drawing where possible on coal-related skills, capacities and resources. 
 There may be a need for additional support for those local areas with fewer 
advantages and more limited capacities to adapt to new opportunities.  
 Last, political patience is needed to provide space for policy experimentation and 
learning, as well as potential policy failures. At the same time, celebrating small 
victories can help to shift cognitive lock in and oppose a culture of defeat. 
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